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ECONOMICS 1410 / KENNEDY SCHOOL SUP-125 
Public Economics: Designing Government Policy 
Professors Stefanie Stantcheva and Stan Veuger 
 
 
 
Teaching Fellow: Tanggang Yuan, tanggangyuan@g.harvard.edu  
 
Course Description: This course analyzes what role the government plays and should play in a 
market economy, especially those policies that work through taxes and government spending. It 
covers topics such as tax and welfare policy, unemployment insurance, environmental protection, 
social security, and state and local policy. The course emphasizes recent empirical research on policy 
issues and will teach students how to conduct such studies. 
 
The first half of the course, taught mainly by Professor Stantcheva, will cover the basic principles of 
public economics. These principles will be used to shed light on current questions and debates on tax 
policy. The second half of the course, taught mainly by Professor Veuger, will discuss recent research 
on taxation, health care, the regulatory state, political economy, and state and local policy. This part of 
the course will also teach students current econometric methods used in public economics. 
 
Prerequisites: Economics 1010a or 1011a or permission of the instructors. Familiarity with 
multivariate calculus and econometrics (at the level of economics 1123 or 1126) is desirable. 
 
Course Mechanics: 
1) Lectures – Two lectures per week. MW 3:00 to 4:15 in Sever Hall 308. 
2) Sections – One per week. Room and time TBA. 
3) Readings – Jonathan Gruber, Public Finance and Public Policy (5th edition), is the optional but 
recommended textbook. Other readings are listed below. 
4) Assignments will be posted on the course website, which should be checked regularly: 
https://canvas.harvard.edu/courses/60932 
 
Grading: Grades will be based on a midterm exam (30 percent), final exam (50 percent), and problem 
sets (20 percent). Because you will have two weeks to complete each problem set and in order to 
allow the solutions to be posted quickly on the course webpage, late problem sets will not be accepted. 
 
Term Paper Option: Students may write a term paper that contains original research on a topic in 
public economics. The term paper satisfies the Economics Department’s writing requirement for 
economics concentrators. See below for more details on this option. 
 
Academic Accommodations: Students needing academic accommodations because of a documented 
disability must present their Faculty Letter from the Accessible Education Office (AEO) by Monday, 
September 23. 
 
Collaboration: Discussion and the exchange of ideas are essential to academic work. You are 
encouraged to consult with your classmates on the choice of paper topics and to share sources. You 
may find it useful to discuss your chosen topic with your peers, particularly if you are working on the 
same topic as a classmate. However, you should ensure that any written work you submit for 
evaluation is the result of your own research and writing and that it reflects your own approach to the 
topic. You must also adhere to standard citation practices in this discipline and properly cite any 
books, articles, websites, lectures, etc. that have helped you with your work. If you received any help 
with your writing (e.g., feedback on drafts), you must also acknowledge this assistance. 
 
No collaboration of any kind is allowed during exams. On problem sets, you may consult with your 
classmates and the teaching staff. However, you must write up your own solutions in your own words 
based on your own understanding. 
 
Frequently asked questions: 
 
1. Textbook. You are welcome to buy any edition of the textbook. The textbook provides useful 
background material but the lectures do not follow any book. Therefore, attending class is 
critical. The textbook would be an especially useful resource for students interested in writing 
a senior honors thesis or term paper on a policy related topic. 
 
2. Grading option. The course must be taken for a letter grade. However, you are welcome to sit 
in on the lectures if you choose not to take the class for credit. 
 
3. Adding the course late. The last day to add the course without a fee is September 24. You may 
add the course until this date, but only if you have attended the lectures and kept up with the 
readings. Borrowing notes from others is not sufficient. Therefore, if you think that you may 
want to take the course for credit, you should attend class and complete the coursework on-
time (e.g., readings, problem sets, term paper proposals), as if you are enrolled in the course. 
We may ask to see your class notes before signing your add form. 
 
4. Cross-registration and website access. The course is open to students from other faculties and 
from MIT. In order to view the files on the course website, students enrolled in the course 
will need to log-in with a Harvard University ID and pin. Students enrolled through the 
Kennedy School course or who otherwise do not have a HUID can sign up for an XID at: 
 
https://xid.harvard.edu/xid-apps/displaySSCreateForm.do 
 
5. Course meetings. The course meets on Monday and Wednesday. A detailed lecture schedule is 
outlined below. 
 
6. Attendance. Students who are enrolled in the course for credit are responsible for all material 
covered and any course announcements made in lecture and section. You should only enroll 
in the class for credit if you can attend class regularly. Students who have had to miss more 
than one or two lectures in the past have had difficulty on problem sets and exams and have 
not done well in the course. 
 
7. Other readings. Academic journal articles listed on the reading list below will be distributed 
electronically for your convenience. Please see the course website for details on the 
procedure that we will use. All articles should also be available to Harvard College students 
for free by searching for the title in Google Scholar: 
 
http://scholar.google.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/schhp?inst=harvard.edu 
 
or as working papers through the National Bureau of Economic Research website: 
 
http://www.nber.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/ 
 
8. Exams. The midterm exam will be held in class on October 23. You should only enroll in the 
class for credit if you can be in attendance to take the midterm on this date. The date, time, 
and location of the final exam will be assigned by the registrar’s office. 
 
No notes or books are allowed during either exam. You may use a calculator. 
 
Term paper option 
 
Students writing a term paper will not have to complete the assignments. Instead, the term paper will 
count for 20 percent of the grade. A term paper proposal is due on 9/24. The completed term paper is 
due 3 days before the final exam. 
 
Most term papers use Stata, which is available for download at: https://downloads.fas.harvard.edu/ 
 
Papers from previous years include the following. 
 
1. The effect of the Bush tax cuts on the spread between tax-exempt and taxable securities 
(using data on yields from Baker Library at HBS) 
2. Using asset prices to measure the general equilibrium incidence of Supreme Court rulings 
on producers of GMO foods (using Fama-French and CRSP data from the WRDS database) 
3. The effect of professional sports franchises and stadiums on employment and local 
economic growth 
4. The effect of top marginal tax rates on executive compensation (using ExecuComp data
 from the WRDS database) 
5. Gender inequality and intergenerational mobility (using female-male wage gaps constructed 
from the CPS and intergenerational mobility data from the Equality of Opportunity Project) 
  
LECTURE DATES 
 
1. Wednesday, September 4 Veuger - Intro; Empirical Methods for Public Economics 
 
2. Monday, September 9 Stantcheva - Income Distribution, Poverty, Taxes and 
Transfers 
3. Wednesday, September 11 Stantcheva - Theoretical Tools for Public Economics 
 
4. Monday, September 16 Stantcheva - Tax Incidence 
5. Wednesday, September 18  Stantcheva - Optimal Labor Income Taxation 
 
6. Monday, September 23 Stantcheva - Taxes and Labor Supply [AEO letters due; 
PS1 assigned] 
7. Wednesday, September 25 Stantcheva - Taxes and Reported Income  
 
Monday, September 30  No Class (Rosh Hashanah) 
8. Wednesday, October 2  Stantcheva - Externalities 
 
9. Monday, October 7   Stantcheva - Public Goods 
Wednesday, October 9  No Class (Yom Kippur) 
10. Friday, October 11 Stantcheva - Social Insurance (intro) and Health Insurance 
(Part I) [PS1 due] 
 
Monday, October 14   No Class (Columbus Day) 
11. Wednesday, October 16  Veuger - The Federal Budget 
 
12. Monday, October 21  Stantcheva - Stantcheva: Health Insurance (Part II) 
13. Wednesday, October 23  Midterm 
14. Friday, October 25  Veuger – Social Security  
 
15. Monday, October 28  Veuger – Tax Reform 
16. Wednesday, October 30  Veuger – Business Taxation 
 
17. Monday, November 4  Veuger – Politics and Policy 
18. Wednesday, November 6  Veuger – Politics and Policy / Regulation [PS 2 assigned] 
 
Monday, November 11  No Class (Veterans Day) 
19. Wednesday, November 13 Veuger - Regulation 
 
20. Monday, November 18  Veuger – Multilevel Government 
21. Wednesday, November 20 Veuger – Multilevel Government 
 
22. Monday, November 25  Veuger – Health Care Reform [PS 2 due] 
Wednesday, November 27  No Class (Thanksgiving) 
 
23. Monday, December 2  Stantcheva - Unemployment Insurance, 
Disability Insurance, Workers’ Compensation; Review  
READINGS 
 
September 4: Introduction and Empirical Methods for Public Economics   Veuger 
 
Gruber, Chapter 3 
 
J. Angrist and J.-S. Pischke (2010) “The Credibility Revolution in Empirical Economics: 
How Better Research Design is Taking the Con out of Econometrics”, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 24(2): 3-30. 
 
H. Low and C. Meghir (2017) “The Use of Structural Models in Econometrics,” Journal 
of Economic Perspectives 31(2): 33-58. (optional) 
 
W.G. Gale (2019) “Government at a Glance.” In: Fiscal Therapy: Curing America’s 
Debt Addiction and Investing in the Future. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 17-
32. 
 
L. Linden and J. Rockoff (2008) “There Goes the Neighborhood? Estimates of the Impact 
of Crime Risk on Property Values from Megan’s Laws,” American Economic Review 
98(3): 1103-1127. (optional) 
 
H. Allcott, R. Diamond, and J.-P. Dubé (2018) “The Geography of Poverty and Nutrition: 
Food Deserts and Food Choices Across the United States,” NBER Working Paper 24094. 
(optional) 
 
R. Diamond and T.J. McQuade (2019) “Who Wants Affordable Housing in their 
Backyard? An Equilibrium Analysis of Low Income Property Development,” Journal of 
Political Economy, 127(3): 1063-1117. (optional) 
 
September 9: Income Distribution, Poverty, Taxes and Transfers         Stantcheva 
 
Gruber, Chapters 17 and 18 
 
Piketty, Thomas, and Emmanuel Saez (2003) “Income Inequality in the United States, 
1913-1998,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(1): 1-41. (optional) 
 
Atkinson, Anthony B., Thomas Piketty, and Emmanuel Saez (2011) “Top Incomes in the 
Long-Run of History,” Journal of Economic Literature 49(1): 3-71. (optional) 
 
September 11: Theoretical Tools for Public Economics                  Stantcheva 
 
Gruber, Chapter 2 
 
Saez, Emmanuel and Stefanie Stantcheva (2016) “Generalized Social Marginal Welfare 
Weights for Optimal Tax Theory,” American Economic Review 106(1): 24-45. 
 
September 16: Tax Incidence              Stantcheva 
 
Gruber, Chapter 19 
 
Chetty, Raj, Adam Looney, and Kory Kroft (2009) “Salience and Taxation: Theory and 
Evidence,” American Economic Review 99(4): 1145-1177. (optional) 
 
Doyle Jr, Joseph J., and Krislert Samphantharak (2008) “$2.00 Gas! Studying the Effects 
of a Gas Tax Moratorium,” Journal of Public Economics 92(3): 869-884. (optional) 
 
September 18: Optimal Labor Income Taxation           Stantcheva 
 
Gruber, Chapter 20 and 21 
 
Diamond, Peter, and Emmanuel Saez (2011) “From Basic Research to Policy 
Recommendations: The Case for a Progressive Tax,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 
25(4): 165-190. (optional) 
 
Piketty, Thomas, and Emmanuel Saez (2013) “Optimal Labor Income Taxation,” 
Handbook of Public Economics, Volume 5, Amsterdam: Elsevier-North Holland. 
 
Saez, Emmanuel (2002) “Optimal Income Transfer Programs: Intensive versus Extensive 
Labor Supply Responses,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 117(3): 1039-1073. 
(optional) 
 
September 23: Taxes and Labor Supply             Stantcheva 
 
Gruber, Chapter 21 
 
Chetty, R., J. Friedman and E. Saez (2013) “Using Differences in Knowledge Across 
Neighborhoods to Uncover the Impacts of the EITC on Earnings,” American Economic 
Review 103(7): 2683-2721. (optional) 
 
Eissa, N. and J. Liebman (1996) “Labor Supply Response to the Earned Income Tax 
Credit,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 111: 605-637. (optional) 
 
Saez, E. “Do Taxpayers Bunch at Kink Points?” (2010) American Economic Journal: 
Economic Policy, 2: 180-212. (optional) 
 
Pencavel, J. (1986) “Labor Supply of Men: A Survey,” Handbook of Labor Economics, 
Volume 1, Chapter 1. (optional) 
 
Heckman, J. and M. Killingsworth (1986) “Female Labor Supply: A Survey,” Handbook 
of Labor Economics, Volume 1, Chapter 2. (optional) 
 
September 25: Taxes and Reported Income            Stantcheva 
 
Saez, Emmanuel, Joel Slemrod, and Seth H. Giertz (2012) “The Elasticity of Taxable 
Income with Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical Review,” Journal of Economic 
Literature 50(1): 3-50. (optional) 
 
Piketty, Thomas, Emmanuel Saez, and Stefanie Stantcheva (2014) “Optimal Taxation of 
Top Labor Incomes: A Tale of Three Elasticities,” American Economic Journal: 
Economic Policy, 6(1). (optional) 
 
Akcigit, Ufuk, Salomé Baslandze, and Stefanie Stantcheva (2016) “Taxation and the 
International Mobility of Inventors,” American Economic Review 106 (10): 2930–2981. 
(optional) 
 
Goolsbee, Austan (2000) “What Happens When You Tax the Rich? Evidence from 
Executive Compensation,” Journal of Political Economy 108: 352-378. (optional) 
 
October 2: Externalities              Stantcheva 
 
Gruber, Chapter 5 and 6 
 
Gruber, Jonathan (2001) “Tobacco at the Crossroads: The Past and Future of Smoking 
Regulation in the United States,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 15(2): 193-212. 
(optional) 
 
Nordhaus, William D. (2006) “After Kyoto: Alternative Mechanisms to Control Global 
Warming,” American Economic Review 96(2): 31- 34. (optional) 
 
October 7: Public Goods              Stantcheva 
 
Gruber, Chapter 1 and 7 
 
October 11: Social Insurance (Intro) and Health Insurance (Part I)        Stantcheva 
 
Gruber, Chapter 12, 15, and 16 
 
Case, Anne and Angus Deaton (2017) “Mortality and Morbidity in the 21st Century,” 
Brookings Papers in Economic Activity. (optional) 
 
Currie, Janet, and Jonathan Gruber (1997) “The Technology of Birth: Health Insurance, 
Medical Interventions, and Infant Health,” NBER Working Paper 5985. (optional) 
 
Finkelstein, Amy, Sarah Taubman, Bill Wright, Mira Bernstein, Jonathan Gruber, Joseph 
P. Newhouse, Heidi Allen, and Katherine Baicker (2012) “The Oregon Health Insurance 
Experiment: Evidence from the First Year,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 127(3): 
1057-1106. (optional) 
 
Einav, Liran, Amy Finkelstein, and Paul Schrimpf (2013) “The Response of Drug 
Expenditures to Nonlinear Contract Design: Evidence from Medicare Part D,” NBER 
Working Paper 19393. (optional) 
 
October 16: The Federal Budget   Veuger
 
Gruber, Chapter 4 
 
Congressional Budget Office. The 2019 Long-Term Budget Outlook. June 2019. 
 
W.G. Gale (2019) “Government at a Glance.” In: Fiscal Therapy: Curing America’s 
Debt Addiction and Investing in the Future. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 17-
32. 
 
Capretta, James C. (2019) “The Congressional Budget Process: A Brief Primer,” AEI 
Economic Perspectives 2018-02 (February). (optional) 
 
October 21: Health Insurance (Part II)            Stantcheva 
 
Gruber, Chapter 15 and 16 
 
Case, Anne and Angus Deaton (2017) “Mortality and Morbidity in the 21st Century,” 
Brookings Papers in Economic Activity. (optional) 
 
Currie, Janet, and Jonathan Gruber (1997) “The Technology of Birth: Health Insurance, 
Medical Interventions, and Infant Health,” NBER Working Paper 5985. (optional) 
 
Finkelstein, Amy, Sarah Taubman, Bill Wright, Mira Bernstein, Jonathan Gruber, Joseph 
P. Newhouse, Heidi Allen, and Katherine Baicker (2012) “The Oregon Health Insurance 
Experiment: Evidence from the First Year,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 127(3): 
1057-1106. (optional) 
 
Einav, Liran, Amy Finkelstein, and Paul Schrimpf (2013) “The Response of Drug 
Expenditures to Nonlinear Contract Design: Evidence from Medicare Part D,” NBER 
Working Paper 19393. (optional) 
 
October 25: Social Security          Veuger 
 
Gruber, Chapter 13 
 
Martin Feldstein, “Structural Reform of Social Security,” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, Spring 2005, pp 33-55. 
 
Martin Feldstein and Jeffrey Liebman, “The Distributional Effects of an Investment 
Based Social Security System,” in Martin Feldstein and Jeffrey Liebman, eds., The 
Distributional Aspects of Social Security and Social Security Reform, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2002, 263-326. (optional) 
 
Coile, Courtney, Kevin S. Milligan, and David A. Wise (2016) “Health Capacity to Work 
at Older Ages: Evidence from the U.S.” NBER Working Paper No. 21940. (optional) 
 
James M. Poterba, Steven F. Venti and David A. Wise (1996) “How Retirement Savings 
Programs Increase Saving,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 10(4): 91-112. (optional) 
 
Eric M. Engen, William G. Gale, and John Karl Scholz (1996) “The Illusory Effects of 
Savings Incentives,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 10(4): 113-138. (optional) 
 
Biggs, Andrew G., and Sylvester Schieber (2014) “Is There a Retirement Crisis?” 
National Affairs. Summer. 
 
Beshears, John, James J. Choi, David Laibson, Brigitte C. Madrian, William L. 
Skimmyhorn (2019) “Borrowing to Save? The Impact of Automatic Enrollment on 
Debt,” NBER Working Paper No. 25876. (optional) 
 
October 28: Tax Reform          Veuger 
 
Gruber, Chapter 25 
 
Martin Feldstein (2011) “Tax Reform: Evidence of 1986,” The Wall Street Journal, 
October 14. (optional) 
 
Elmendorf, Douglas (2015) “‘Dynamic Scoring’: Why and How to Include 
Macroeconomic Effects in Budget Estimates for Legislative Proposals,” Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity, Fall. (optional) 
 
Martin Feldstein (2015) “Raising Revenue by Limiting Tax Expenditures,” Tax Policy 
and the Economy, Vol. 29. (optional) 
 
PwC Washington National Tax Services (2017) “Congress Gives Final Approval to Tax 
Reform Conference Committee Agreement,” Tax Insight, December 2017. (optional) 
 
R. Barro and J. Furman (2018) “The Macroeconomic Effects of the 2017 Tax Reform,” 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring. 
 
Veuger, Stan (2018) “8 Ways to Improve the Tax Code,” National Interest, January 5. 
 
Brill, Alex, and Choe, Derrick (2018) “Charitable Giving and the Tax Cuts and Jobs 
Act,” AEI Economic Perspectives 2018-06 (June). (optional) 
 
Veuger, Stan (2019) “Modern Monetary Theory and Policy,” AEI Economic Perspectives 
2019-01a. (optional) 
 
October 30: Business Taxation        Veuger 
 
Gruber, Chapter 24 (optional) 
 
Saul Levmore and Hideki Kanda (1991) “Taxes, Agency Costs, and the Price of 
Incorporation,” Virginia Law Review 77: 211-256. 
 
Raj Chetty and Emmanuel Saez (2005) “Dividend Taxes and Corporate Behavior: 
Evidence from the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 120(3): 
791–833. (optional) 
 
Danny Yagan (2015) "Capital Tax Reform and the Real Economy: The Effects of the 
2003 Dividend Tax Cut," American Economic Review 105(12) pp. 3531-3563. 
 
J. C. Suárez Serrato and O. Zidar (2016) “Who Benefits from State Corporate Tax Cuts? 
A Local Labor Markets Approach with Heterogeneous Firms,” American Economic 
Review 106(9): 2582-2624. (optional) 
 
PwC Washington National Tax Services (2017) “Congress Gives Final Approval to Tax 
Reform Conference Committee Agreement,” Tax Insight, December 2017. (optional) 
 
November 4 and 6: Politics and Policy       Veuger 
 
 Gruber, Chapter 9 
 
Downs, Anthony (1957). "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," 
Journal of Political Economy 65(2): 135–150. (optional) 
 
Madestam, Andreas, Daniel Shoag, Stan Veuger, and David Yanagizawa-Drott (2013) 
"Do Political Protests Matter? Evidence from the Tea Party Movement," Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 128(4): 1633-1685. 
 
Baker, Scott R., Nicholas Bloom, and Steven J. Davis (2016) “Measuring Economic 
Policy Uncertainty, Quarterly Journal of Economics 131(4): 1593–1636. 
 
Alesina, Alberto and Nouriel Roubini (1992) “Political Cycles in OECD Economies” 
Review of Economic Studies 59(4): 663-688. (optional) 
 
Stephens-Davidowitz, Seth (2014) “The Cost of Racial Animus on a Black Candidate: 
Evidence using Google Search Data,” Journal of Public Economics 118: 26-40. 
(optional) 
 
November 6 and 13: Regulation 
 
Chapter 5 and 8 
 
Weitzman, Martin L. (1974) “Prices vs. Quantities,” Review of Economic Studies 41(4): 
477-491. (optional) 
 
Summers, Lawrence (1989) “Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits,” American 
Economic Review 79(2): 177-183. 
 
Gruber, Jonathan (1994) “The Incidence of Mandated Maternity Benefits,” American 
Economic Review 84(3): 622-641. 
 
Clemens, Jeffrey (2008) “Opium in Afghanistan: Prospects for the Success of Source   
Country Drug Control Policies,” Journal of Law and Economics 51(3): 407-432. 
(optional) 
 
Cicala, Steve (2015) “When Does Regulation Distort Costs? Lessons from Fuel 
Procurement in US Electricity Generation,” American Economic Review 105(1): 411-
444. (optional) 
 
Clemens, Jeffrey, and Michael Wither (2019) “The Minimum Wage and the Great 
Recession: Evidence of Effects on the Employment and Income Trajectories of Low-
Skilled Workers,” Journal of Public Economics 170: 53-67. (optional) 
 
Clemens, Jeffrey (2019) “Making Sense of the Minimum Wage: A Roadmap for 
Navigating Recent Research,” Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 867. 
 
Shoag, Daniel, and Veuger, Stan (2019) ““Ban the Box” Measures Help High-Crime 
Neighborhoods,” Mimeo: Case Western Reserve University and American Enterprise 
Institute. (optional) 
 
November 18 and 20: Multilevel Government      Veuger 
 
Gruber, Chapter 10 and 11 
 
Blanchard, Olivier J., and Lawrence F. Katz, "Regional Evolutions," Brookings Papers 
on Economic Activity, no. 1 (1992). (optional) 
 
Davis, Donald R., and David E. Weinstein, "Bones, Bombs, and Break Points: The 
Geography of Economic Activity," American Economic Review 92, no. 5 (2002), 1269-
1289.  
 
Tiebout, Charles (1956) “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures,” Journal of Political 
Economy 64(5): 416-424. (optional) 
 
Hoxby, Caroline (2000) “Does Competition among Public Schools Benefit Students and 
Taxpayers?” American Economic Review 90(5): 1209-1238. (optional) 
 
Ganong, Peter, and Daniel Shoag (2017) “Why Has Regional Income Convergence in the 
U.S. Declined?” Journal of Urban Economics 102 (November): 76-90. 
 Glaeser, Edward L., and Joseph Gyourko, "Urban Decline and Durable Housing” Journal 
of Political Economy 113, no. 2 (2005), 345-375. (optional) 
 
Shoag, Daniel, and Stan Veuger (2018) “Shops and the City: Evidence on Local 
Externalities and Local Government Policy from Big-Box Bankruptcies,” Review of 
Economics and Statistics 100(3): 440-453. 
 
Shoag, Daniel, Cody Tuttle, and Stan Veuger (2019) “Rules versus Home Rule: Local 
Government Responses to Negative Revenue Shocks,” National Tax Journal 72(3): 543-
574. (optional) 
 
November 25: Health Care Reform         Veuger 
 
 Gruber, Chapter 15 and 16 (optional) 
 
Congressional Budget Office. The 2019 Long-Term Budget Outlook. June 2019. 
 
Blahous, Charles (2019) “The Unanswered Questions for Medicare for All,” AEI 
Economic Perspectives 2019-02 (February). 
 
Holahan, John, and Linda J. Blumberg (2018) Estimating the Cost of a Single-Payer 
Plan. Urban Institute Health Policy Center. 
 
Clemens, Jeffrey, and Joshua Gottlieb (2014) “Do Physicians' Financial Incentives Affect 
Treatment Patterns and Patient Health?” American Economic Review 104(4): 1320-1349. 
(optional) 
 
Clemens, Jeffrey (2015) “Regulatory Redistribution in the Market for Health Insurance,” 
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 7(2): 109-134. (optional) 
 
Clemens, Jeffrey, and Joshua Gottlieb (2017) “In the Shadow of a Giant: Medicare's 
Influence on Private Payment Systems,” Journal of Political Economy 125(1): 1-39. 
 
December 2: Unemployment & Disability Insurance, Workers’ Compensation       Stantcheva 
 
Gruber, Chapter 14 
 
Bound, John (1989) “The Health and Earnings of Rejected Disability Insurance 
Applicants,” American Economic Review 79(3): 482-503. (optional) 
 
Card, David, Raj Chetty, and Andrea Weber (2007) “The Spike at Benefit Exhaustion: 
Leaving the Unemployment System or Starting a New Job?” American Economic Review 
97(2): 113-118. (optional) 
 
Gruber, Jonathan (1997) “The Consumption Smoothing Benefits of Unemployment 
Insurance,” American Economic Review. (optional) 
